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1. Introduction 
Airline deregulation began in the United States in 1978, introducing dramatic changes 
that opened the door to competition, lowered fares, and reshaped the industry. It also created new 
problems, leaving major carriers in a precarious financial condition, increasing congestion in 
airport terminals and in the air, and leading to mergers that could eventually threaten the 
competition the original reforms were designed to encourage. During the past 30 years, new 
issues have emerged and become prominent—particularly safety and security. After more than a 
quarter century, it is important to review what has happened and to delineate the lessons that can 
be learned from the deregulation experience. 
Normally, implementation has to do with the introduction of a program or a policy that 
creates or establishes something. This paper focuses on the implementation of a policy designed 
to eliminate government intervention in the airline industry, i.e., deregulation. It would help to 
broaden the length of time in which the implementation of policies is analyzed, so as to identify 
long-term variables that are relevant for implementation and how these apply to other 
deregulating environments, especially in emerging market economies.  
This paper develops an implementation framework that considers deregulation as part of 
a larger implementation analysis; identifies an appropriate model for deregulation and one more 
specific for the deregulation of the U.S. airline industry; and assesses the significance of the 
factors/variables involved. In many cases, e.g., Latin American and Caribbean countries, various 
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reforms including deregulation have not produced the expected results. In other cases, e.g., 
China, market economy reforms have sprung significant economic activity and growth.  This 
paper helps to spell out the main lessons learnt in advanced economies, and how these lessons 
can apply to other deregulatory environments, especially Asian and Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. 
2. What Is Implementation? 
The verb “to implement” means, in its most basic sense, to carry out, to fulfill, or to 
accomplish. A legislative or executive entity most often enacts this decision (e.g., Congress’s 
legislation, a president’s executive order, an agency’s regulation), but the executive branch or the 
judiciary can also issue a directive or legal ruling. Implementation puts the objectives of policy 
adopters into action in an effort to accomplish the desired results. Implementation constitutes a 
typical public sector feature and is at the core of public sector activities. The foundations of 
implementation are broadly accepted:  
i) Implementation is directly related to the organization and the public administration.  
ii) Implementation is a process that explains—depending on the specific case—the output, 
the performance, or the nonultimate outcome.  
iii) Implementation is not evaluation, which is concerned with the impact of the 
program/policy.  
iv) Public policy implementation takes place in a complex and dynamic environment 
requires not only an active role of the Public Administration (PA) but also that 
institutions and organizations outside the PA operate effectively.  
Implementation can be also regarded as part of the analysis of organizations and 
particularly of the public administration1. In this sense, “if implementation researchers make 
their product more useful to policy makers they are likely to extend our notions about 
                                                 
1 Malcolm L. Goggin  “Too Few Cases /Too Many Variables. Problems in Implementation Research”. Western 
Political Quarterly 39, 2, p. (1986) p.335 
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organizations and management.”2 And also implementation involves “behaviors that have both 
administrative and political content.”3 The implication is that the extent to which a 
program/policy succeeds or fails is related in large part to how people and organizations behave 
under administrative and political pressures.  
                                                
Implementation occurs in the middle of the policy process. It results from the stages that 
precede it, policy formulation and adoption, and it affects the subsequent stages, evaluation and 
redesign. When applied to public policy, implementation is the process of putting into effect or 
carrying out an authoritative decision of government. It normally follows a strategy that the 
department/agency involved in the policy would issue to guide its actions. Implementation is a 
“process” and must be distinguished from the results of that process; studies of implementation 
remain distinct from those of evaluation, the latter being focused on the impact of the 
policy/program and the former on the process 4. Evaluation explains what happened; 
implementation explains why it happened. The point of the process is reinforced by clarifying 
that evaluation deals with the assessment of whether the goal of a program or policy is achieved 
and how it is achieved; e.g., is the result of the program/policy linked to the program/policy or 
was it influenced by the external environment, or a combination of the two? In the definition of 
evaluation, the implementation process links the program/policy to the final outcome5.   
3. A Framework for Analysis 
A very far-reaching review of the implementation literature points that a “literature with 
three hundred critical variables does not need more variables: it needs structure” suggesting a 
taxonomy of the types of implementation in an ambiguity-conflict matrix (see Exhibit 1 below) 
that would also help to achieve the objective of parsimony6.  Exhibit 1 includes at the center the 
indication of the main factor that influences implementation—e.g., power in the case of political 
implementation, and resources in the case of administrative implementation. 
 
2 Walter Williams, Richard Elmore, John Stuart Hall , Richard Jung, Michael Kirst, Susan MacManus, Betty Narver, 
Richard Nathan and Robert Yin.Studying Implementation, p.2, (New Jersey: Chatam House Publishers, 1982). 
3 Malcolm L. Goggin  op cit  p,330 
4 Malcolm L. Goggin, Ann Bowman, James Lester and Laurence  O’Toole Implementation Theory and Practice: 
Toward a Third Generation, (New York: HarperCollins, 1990) 
5 T. Huey Chen.  Practical Program Evaluation: Assessing and Improving Planning, Implementation, and 
Effectiveness, (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 2004). 
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Exhibit 1: Ambiguity – Conflict Matrix: Policy 
Implementation Process
2
Symbolic Implementation
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Ex: Communities Action agencies
1
Experimental Implementation
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4
Political Implementation
Power
Ex: Deregulation
3
Administrative Implementation
Resources
Ex: Smallpox eradication
Low
Ambiguity
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Low HighConflict
 
In Matland’s framework, conflict and ambiguity constitute the key dimensions to capture 
the concepts of complexity and dynamism and the consequent interactions between players that 
characterize public policy and its implementation.  
As a complement to Matland, an interesting taxonomy presents the type of 
implementation situation to be studied and the type of analysis to be used7. They propose two 
categories: multiple or single events related to the implementation; and organizations—single 
and multiple—involved in the application of the policy.  
Exhibit 2 includes the four cross categories identifying the appropriate type of analysis.  
                                                                                                                                                             
6 Richard E. Matland  “Synthesizing the Implementation Literature: The Ambiguity-Conflict Model of Policy 
Implementation”. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, Vol. 5, p.141(1995)  
7 Michael Hill and Peter Hupe Implementing Public Policy, (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 2006), p.141 
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Single Multiple
Single Qualitative Analysis (1) Qualitative Analysis (3)
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Quantitative Analysis 
backed by Qualitative 
Analysis (2)
Quantitative Analysis (4)
Organizations Involved in the Implementation
Events
Exhibit 2 : Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of Implementation
 
For instance, in the case of the involvement of a single organization and single event, the 
most appropriate method is the case study. In category 2—i.e., a single organization making 
multiple decisions and with multiple events (e.g., a regulatory agency making decisions about 
pollution or the decisions of the social security agency)—quantitative analysis is possible, 
provided a sufficient number of observations are available. In category 3—a single event, with a 
number of organizations being involved—the quantification would be feasible if complemented 
by qualitative analysis. An example is the privatization of a service at the national or municipal 
level.  The fourth category—i.e., multiple events and multiple organizations—includes a series 
of complex public/private sector activities and players of various private/public and hybrid 
nature as well as interactions. Under these circumstances, quantitative analysis is more 
appropriate.  
The frameworks of Matland and of Hill and Hupe8 are complementary and instrumental 
for locating the implementation of a given policy/program. They also appropriately include new 
areas of public policy implementation, such as the deregulations of the 1970s and early 1980s -
particularly airline deregulation.  
4. New Areas for Public Policy Implementation 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the category of traditional policy regulation expanded in two 
directions: more social regulation, which includes safety and security; and less economic 
regulation. In the latter respect, deregulation took place and was widespread in the United States 
                                                 
8 Ibid 
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as well as in other countries. In other words, in a dynamic and complex environment, the 
government started to remove interventions and dismantle programs. At the same time, 
government regulation expanded into new areas, such as safety and security. 
A specific interest is that of assessing the implementation of regulatory or deregulatory 
policies. Regulation as a field in which public administration is involved and active was 
identified relatively early9. The assumption in the area of regulation is that the government or the 
appropriate agency does something, e.g., issuing safety regulations that companies should 
respect. An important aspect of the implementation of policies and programs has to do with 
implementation in the area of regulation and the role that those affected by the policies have on 
the implementation process and on the overall success of the policy and program. In the case of 
regulation, significant interests are at stake, and there are very strong players that have the 
capacity to affect the output and the outcome.  In this respect, the issue of regulatory capture is 
particularly relevant10. 
There have been significant efforts to research regulatory policy implementation11. 
Research confirms that implementation in the regulatory environment requires negotiation and 
not a bottom-up approach where polices are dictated12.  Ripley and Franklin analyze the 
implementation of the competitive regulations of the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board for the period 
1938–74 and argue “implementation was relatively easy for 36 years. The decision rules 
governed most cases, the privileged competitors remain privileged and the newcomers remained 
genuine competitors in name only.” They also recognize that deregulation is part of government 
activity: “Deregulation is no more neutral in intent and implementation than regulation”13. As 
the regulatory system has been relaxed, substantial gains in productivity have occurred, and the 
public has benefited from lower fares and more choices due to competition. This process can be 
regarded as an implementation process in which the dependent variable is represented by output 
                                                 
9  Theodore Lowi “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory”. World Politics 15, (1964) 
677–715.  
10 G. Stigler 1971 “The Theory of Economic Regulation”. Bell  J. Econ. Man. Sci. 2:3-21.  
11 James Q. Wilson 1982. The Politics of Regulation, (New York: Basic Books, 1982): Eugene Bardach And Robert 
Kagan Editors Social Regulation,(New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1982). 
12 Robert. Durant “EPA, TVA and Pollution Control: Implications for a Theory of Regulatory Policy 
implementation”.  Public Administration Review, vol. 44, 4, (1984) pp. 305-315. 
13 Randall Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Policy Implementation and Bureaucracy, (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 
1986). pp.123-136. 
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or non-ultimate outcome, i.e., performance indicators. In turn, these performance indicators can 
be affected by a series of independent variables of the type that Mazmanian and Sabatier 
identified14. Implementation—particularly in the regulatory area—requires that the 
agency/department involved comprehend the intervention, is capable of undertaking the 
intervention, and is willing to intervene15.  
  Deregulation also represents an example of how implementation incorporates the 
complexity and the interactions among various players, public, private, and mixed or “hybrid” 
entities (e.g., in the case of the deregulation of airlines, government departments, agencies, 
airports, and airlines), all of which must be analyzed to gain a broader understanding of the 
complexity and dynamism of implementation in the public sector. The other important element 
that characterizes the implementation of policies of deregulation—inherently connected with the 
complexity—is the notion of time. Policies to implement deregulation can be effectively studied 
in two different and complementary fashions. The first is a short-term approach to detect that the 
political and administrative activities have been in place to assure that the policy of deregulation 
can effectively operate. The second is to take a long-term view—in addition to the activities and 
initiatives of the administrative system connected to the deregulation—to analyze a series of 
variables that are outside the “system” and that were not necessarily anticipated when the policy 
was designed and formulated but that can influence the process of implementation.  
For the second approach that we follow, the challenge is to include the deregulation 
policies as part of implementation and apply an appropriate methodology to explain how factors 
and variables come into play in the case of deregulation. In this respect, the Matland and Hill-
Hupe16 frameworks—as shown in Exhibits 1 and 2—are very useful and would lead to the 
consideration that a type of policy such as deregulation fits the political implementation 
dimension (quadrant 4) of Matland and the type 4 of Hill and Hupe, where multiple actors come 
into play. These frameworks capture the complexity and interactions between players, which are 
included in the independent variables (e.g., see Hill and Hupe 2006, 134–35).  On the basis of the 
                                                 
14 Daniel  Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier, Implementation and Public Policy, (Lanham, Maryland: University Press 
of America, 1989). 
15 Evert. Vedung,  Public Policy and Program Evaluation, ( New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 
1997). pp.227-28.  
16 Hill and Hupe, op cit 
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combined framework of Exhibits 1 and 2, a model of implementation would be of the type 
indicated in Figure 1 below.  
 
 
Figure 1 draws mostly from the model of Mazmanian and Sabatier17 and presents the 
characteristics of a model of implementation with a long-term view.  
The next step is to identify the relevant variables in the context of the framework and 
then “operationalize” the framework for given policies and programs. This leads us to review the 
role of dependent and independent variables for the specific sector/program/policy (e.g., airlines) 
and the use of methods to build and test the models.   
5. A Model for Airline Deregulation 
                                                 
17 Mazmanian, Daniel and Sabatier Paul.  op cit The main elements of the model are: 1) enabling legislation and a 
legal directive that mandate clear and consistent policy objectives and provide criteria for resolving conflicts among 
goals; (2) identification of principal factors and causal linkages (that is, the causal theory behind the policy); (3) the 
role of agencies and supporters; (4) the leaders promoting change; (5) how interest groups affect the program; and 
(6) unexpected and intervening factors and the consequent changes in causal relationships. 
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The need to operationalize the factors and variables that explain a successful 
implementation boils down to two relevant aspects:  
• The choice of the dependent variable  
• The choice of the independent variables 
 
The Choice of the Dependent Variable 
The choice of the dependent variable is made on the basis of various factors, including 
policy characteristics and policy formation. The availability of data should not influence the 
conceptual definition of the dependent variable, which is related to the discovery of the clear 
intention of the policy/program (e.g., legislation). In other words, the choice of the dependent 
variable is not simply the selection of a variable, but it is also intimately connected to the 
function of policy implementation.  A complicating issue is that the formal objective of the 
program can be modified in the phase of implementation, or there can be an “implicit” objective.   
Basically, two different views stand apart for the dependent variable: one claims that the 
dependent variable of implementation should be the outcome or impact; and the other argues that 
the dependent variable should be more of a performance indicator, such as output.   
The literature converges in that the dependent variable of the implementation process 
should be the output or operational goal, and possibly a nonultimate outcome,18 which is related 
to the final impact (e.g., one step removed from the impact). The operational goals, or the 
nonultimate outcome, which represent the dependent variable, must be clear and feasible, easily 
understood by all concerned, and reflect the original intention of the policy/program. The 
mission of agencies should be sharply and unambiguously defined. Datelines must be established 
and respected. The goal can be presumably translated into indices in a time-frame context. 
However,19 programs (and policies) do not exist in a vacuum; instead, they operate in a social 
and economic environment and should take into account these “variables.”  
                                                 
18 The nonultimate outcome could be regarded as a sort of “impact” on the performance measure of the program, 
which does not fully capture the overall impact of the program that can be measured in economic terms as 
improvement (or not) of the societal welfare. 
19 The contribution of  Alan Werner.  A Guide to Implementation Research, (Washington DC: The Urban Institute 
Press 2004), is very valuable for implementation research, even if its focus and examples come exclusively from 
social programs. 
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As I try to translate the model of Figure 1 to fit the case of U.S. airline deregulation, I 
focus on the dependent variable and the concept of performance for the airline industry.  
Load Factor 
In commercial aviation, “load factor” is the measure of capacity utilization. According to 
the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, load factor is the percentage of seating or freight 
that is utilized, i.e., the ratio of paid passenger seats to the total seating capacity of a particular 
flight. The data include both transborder and foreign flights by large U.S. carriers but do not 
include any flights by foreign carriers. The International Civil Aviation Organization 
operationalizes the passenger load factor as passenger-kilometers traveled expressed as a 
percentage of seat-kilometers available. 
The literature recognizes that lower airfares came at the cost of the deterioration of 
comfort for passengers, i.e., a higher load factor20. In the 1970s, domestic flights were less than 
53 percent full; in the period 1997–2000, they averaged more than 70 percent full. However, 
overcrowding reflects the visible result of deregulation and greater efficiency. Nowadays, 
travelers can see that deregulation has forced improvements in efficiency through the intense 
pressure for price competition that it unleashed; for example, airlines have put more seats on 
their planes and succeeded in filling a greater percentage of them.21  
The definition of “load factor” and its measurement as calculated by the International 
Civil Aviation Organization give us arguments to assert that load factor is probably the most 
comprehensive measure to gauge the increased productivity of the airlines—i.e., the supply 
side—but also to capture the demand side in the sense that passengers are willing to fly and to 
increase the capacity available. Load factor represents a universally accepted measure, calculated 
uniformly around the world. It could represent the key variable that the reformers of 1978 had in 
mind. I would also argue that load factor does not give us the measure of the final outcome or 
impact of airline deregulation but provides a very reliable indicator of the nonultimate output 
                                                 
20  Sam Peltzman and Cliford Winston Deregulation of Network Industries: What’s Next? Washington, D.C.: AEI –
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 2000. 
21 There is also evidence that deregulation has brought about a substantial increase in the routes that customers have 
available. 
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factor and the dependent variable of the model. This is in line with Ripley and Franklin22 —
mentioned above—who identify it as the critical variable for the functioning of airlines in a 
competitive environment.  
The Choice of Independent Variables 
The right side of the equation (and on the left side of Figure 1) requires the clarification 
and operationalization of independent variables for the case of airline deregulation.  
The review of the factors and variables of implementation has to deal with the fact that 
implementation involves a large degree of uncertainty and complexity, which are handled to look 
at two types of variations23:  
a. Variation between policy issues, or types of policy issues; 
b. Variations between institutional contexts, which includes the issue of generalization, 
i.e., to what extent the policy applies outside the specific sector/study.  
Following the analysis of Mazmanian and Sabatier24, experts and political scientists have 
identified several variables, which are necessary for effective implementation and would capture 
the two types of variation. This list provides an explanation of the categories, also making some 
references to the case of airline deregulation:  
i) Theory behind deregulation and reform. A solid and articulate theory is a relevant 
factor mostly to introduce the reform, and subsequently the level of support that 
the reform/deregulation enjoys in the society would also determine the 
implementation of the reform.   
ii) Policy characteristics: The policy must be conceptually clear and simple, 
theoretically sound, and stated in terms of desired changes achieved among target 
groups. It is vital that the means-ends analysis actually represents real-world 
cause-effect relationships. In this respect, the taxonomy of Lowi25 for policy types 
can be applied: distributive, redistributive, regulatory, and constituent. 
                                                 
22 Ripley and Franklin, op. cit. 
23 Hill and Hupe, op. cit., p.23 
24 Mazmanian and Sabatier, op. cit.  
25 Lowi, op. cit. 
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iii) Policy formation: This deals with the issue of the relationship between politics and 
administration. The policy should clearly specify who does what and how. Clear 
directives and organizational structures should be issued in the legislative process. 
This category would look at the role of policymakers and also agencies and 
departments as well as their interaction during the formation and the 
implementation periods.  
iv) Effective and recognized leadership, skilled and experienced, should be committed 
to the policy.  
v) Continuous support of public opinion. The executive priority given to the policy 
and its goals must not fade, nor can conflicting public policies or changing 
conditions weaken the implementation of the policy. This implies that over the 
implementation period, there are measures that reflect the support or disapproval 
of public opinion and also measures indicating the policies and behavior in the 
particular area. 
vi) Active constituency (constituency support): Groups and policy champions within 
the government, and possibly public opinion, should support the policy throughout 
the implementation stage. Advisory groups and legislative oversight play a role26. 
The application of policies is affected by the reactions of those affected by the 
policies. Negotiations and bargaining can take place. 
vii) The responses of the agencies/departments involved constitute important 
variable(s) that operate and interact among them and can be the outputs of the 
entities involved or some other indicator that gauges the level of implementation 
related to that particular variable/factor (and agency)27. In this category, the 
activity of the so-called street-level bureaucrats is also included28. This category 
also reflects the administrative effort—undertaken at the federal level—of the 
agencies and departments. 
viii) The technical and budgetary means (resources) should be provided for the period 
of time needed to carry out the mission and achieve the goals. In particular, the 
                                                 
26 Hill and Hupe, op. cit., p. 134. 
27 Hill and Hupe 2006, op. cit., pp.128–30. 
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financing of the policy or program must be secured for an adequate planning time 
horizon. This category should be “operationalized” by taking into consideration 
the budgetary resources that over the period were considered have been assigned 
to the agencies and departments involved in the implementation of airline 
deregulation (e.g., CAB, Federal Aviation Administration, Justice Department). 
ix) The macro political and economic environment, i.e., the external environment. 
Policy outcomes and policy outputs are influenced by a series of exogenous 
variables, over which government agencies and implementers do not have 
influence and about which they have little to say29. As discussed in the subsection 
on dependent variables, the external environment requires the use of control 
variables. 
x) Unexpected events. During the period of implementation, there will likely be 
events that were not or could not be anticipated at the time of the enactment of the 
reform. But as these events occur, they have a great influence on the 
implementation. 
A related point has to do with the quantification of the variables shown in Figure 1. The 
variables do not necessarily fully apply to each implementation analysis of policies and 
programs; i.e., there is not a uniform theory of implementation.  
A set of variables is available to build a testable model for U.S. airline deregulation: 
Indices of economic freedom of the world; Government regulation of business (source: Pew 
Research Center for the People & the Press); Complaints about flight operations; Duration of 
strikes; Total air carriers; Mergers and acquisitions of airline sector; Bankruptcy of airlines; 
Concentration index in the airline sector; Revenue; Costs; Legal environment; Gross domestic 
product per capita; Average price paid for oil. 
 This set of variables constitutes the basis for “operazionalization” of the model of Figure 
1, which is translated into the testable model of Figure 2 below, which allows to test the 
                                                                                                                                                             
28M. Lipsky,  Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Services,(New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1980). 
29K. J. Meier, R. D. Wrinkle and J.L.Polinard  “Politics, Bureaucracy, and Agricultural Policy: An Alternative View 
of Political Control”. American Politics Quarterly 23, 4, (1995) pp. 427–460. 
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variables and the factors—both economic and noneconomic—that influenced the United States’ 
implementation of the deregulation of its airlines, e.g., an analysis of various players in the 
implementation (i.e., antitrust, companies, associations, and users).  
The model of Figure 2 helps us to study implementation in the new dynamic 
environment. Moreover, it provides visual understanding of the interactions that could occur 
between agencies, departments and other entities. The model attempts to capture the most 
complicated environment of policy implementation that would be that of quadrants 2 and 4 of 
Matland30 and the forth category of the framework of Hill and Hupe31.  
The model can be applied to specific circumstances with different methods. One is to use 
instrumental variable and simultaneous equations (two –stage least square (2SLS) of the type 
that Mead advocates32. 
                                                 
30 Matland, op. cit. 
31 Hill and Hupe, op. cit. 
32 Barreto Humberto and Howland Frank. Introductory Econometrics: Using Monte Carlo Simulation, pp. 730-46, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005;  Mead Lauwrence M. “Performance Analysis,” in Policy into 
Action: Implementation Research and Welfare Reform, ed. Mary ClareLennon and Thomas Corbett Washington, 
DC: Urban Institute Press, 2003, chap. 6. 
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Another possibility is to utilize path analysis based on specific survey instrument, or 
times series. Path analysis can be used to test direct and indirect effects. In many cases, path 
analysis involves solving a set of simultaneous equations that theoretically establish the 
relationship among the observed variables in the path model33.  
6. Testing the Implementation Model 
 The dependent variable indicating the output of the implementation process is the load 
factor, the percentage of utilized seating or freight capacity.34 The load factor is determined 
basically by the demand and cost (that is, by the revenues and composite cost in Figure 2). Other 
variables are expected to play a role (for example, the number of air carriers, government 
regulation). Revenue per passenger mile constitutes the most common measure of demand for air 
travel. The composite cost represents the index of the overall cost of airlines (for example, for 
fuel and labor). These two main components of the load factor (cost and demand) are expected to 
be influenced by other variables: government regulation, bankruptcies, mergers and acquisitions, 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI),35 and accidents with respect to the cost; strikes, 
government regulation, GDP per capita, and accidents with respect to the demand. In a path 
analysis framework, the equations are as follows 36: 
• Load Factor = Revenues +Composite Cost + HHI + Strikes                         (1) 
• Revenues = Government regulation + Accidents + GDPpca (GDP per capita)  + Strikes     (2) 
• Composite Cost = Government regulation + Accidents + Bankruptcy + #Air carriers + HHI + 
M&As+ Legal + Oil price.                                         (3) 
 
 
                                                 
33 Randall E. Schumacker and Richard G. Lomax,  A Beginner's Guide to Structural Equation Modeling,  (Florence 
Kentucky: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004). pp.4-7. 
34 Other possibility would be to identify behavioral dependent variables that characterize the performance of the 
implementation. In any event, the quantitative analysis could be further expanded by considering the implementation 
variable as an independent variable to evaluate the impact of the airline deregulation.  
35 This is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is calculated by squaring the market share of 
each firm competing in a market, and then summing the resulting numbers. The U.S. Department of Justice 
considers a result of less than 1,000 to indicate a competitive marketplace; a result of 1,000–1,800 indicates a 
moderately concentrated marketplace; and a result of 1,800 or greater indicates a highly concentrated marketplace. 
36 Lags values are also used. 
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7. Results 
The results are robust, with no multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity and little 
autocorrelation (DW) of the first order in the third equation. The regressions present a high 
Adjusted R2 in the equations (R2 = .90, R2 = 0.46, and R2 = 0.79). The model thus explains a large 
part of the variation of the dependent variable. The F statistic is also significant in all the 
regressions. 
The analysis confirms that demand and composite cost are the relevant variables for the 
load factor and are significant and mostly with the right sign. A decline in the revenue per 
passenger implies a decline in load factor of 0.015. A cost increase has surprisingly a small 
positive impact on the load factor of 0.002. An increase of airline industry concentration as 
indicated by the HHI leads to an increase (a modest 0.001) of the load factor. The variable 
duration of strikes is not significant. 
Revenue is explained by government regulation in the sense that an increase of 
government regulation leads to a decline of revenue (-0.058). The number of aircraft available 
also has a positive impact on revenue (that is, an increase of one aircraft carrier, i.e., an airline 
that enters the market, leads to increased revenue of 0.025). Accidents negatively impact revenue 
(that is, an increase in accidents leads to a decline of revenue); it is significant only at 0.12.GDP 
per capita and duration of strikes is not significant. 
The composite cost is explained by government regulation (that is, with a negative sign), 
which implies that increased regulation has a positive impact on cost (-0.058). The level of 
industry concentration (that is, the HHI index) leads to an increase of the composite cost (0.104). 
Bankruptcy also has a negative sign, which means that an increase in bankruptcies reduces the 
composite cost (-2.9). The number of carriers, accidents and oil price are not significant. 
Direct and Indirect Effects 
The standardized beta coefficients estimated by regular OLS regression represent the path 
coefficients shown in the model for each causal arrow. They represent the direct effect of one 
independent variable on a given endogenous or dependent variable, controlling for other 
independent variables. The direct effect (normally called p) is a standardized effect and is 
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interpreted in terms of standard deviation (SD). A value of p equals 0.241 of the HHI on 
composite cost means that one standard deviation change in HHI (x) has an effect of 0.24 
standard deviations on cost (y).  
An indirect effect is indicated by the impact a given independent variable has on an 
endogenous or the dependent variable by operating through a third (or additional) variable(s) 
following the direction of causation indicated by the arrows. It is computed by taking the product 
of coefficients along any causal pathway between one variable and another, usually between an 
exogenous and intermediate variable through another intermediate variable to the dependent 
variable. The indirect effect of government regulation on load factor through demand is given by 
                    (–0.357)*(–0.384) = 0.137                                                                                           
The total effect of a given independent variable on a dependent variable is the sum of its 
direct and indirect causal effects. The variable government regulation and the HHI index are the 
variables that exercise significant direct and indirect effect on the load factor and on the 
implementation process. 
Government regulation influences the revenue and the cost, and through these two factors has an 
impact on load factor. The total direct and indirect effect of government —calculated based on 
the beta coefficients—is minus 0.80. The HHI has a direct impact on the load factor (–0.210) and 
an indirect effect through cost (0.241). The total direct and indirect effect is 0.09. 
The total causal effects closely resemble the correlations between each of the independent 
variables considered (HHI and Government regulation) and the dependent variable (load factor) 
(i.e., thereby indicating that the causal model is a good fit). In fact, the correlation between HHI 
and the load factor is 0.10, and the correlation between government regulation and the load 
factor is minus 0.77.  
 The differences between the path coefficients and the correlation coefficients suggest that 
there are indirect effects that account for the relationship between the variables. 
It is interesting to underline that the overall result of government regulation over the load 
factor is negative (i.e., more government regulation lowers the load factor).  
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The findings of the paper are preliminary but important for future research and 
particularly with respect to two aspects. First, the findings could prompt to undertake – following 
the framework and the methods proposed in this paper – specific implementation studies, which 
would be applied in the context of an advanced economy such as the USA.  Second, a similar 
kind of approach could also be applied to implementation in emerging economies where the 
institutional setting is weak and very possibly institutional interactions do not take place and lead 
to failure of many policies and programs.  
8.  Conclusions 
The experience of the US airline deregulation confirms that the variables identified for its 
implementation are almost all relevant and interact in different forms, mostly indirectly through 
the intermediation of cost and revenues for airlines. Government regulation has a significant 
impact on both revenue and costs. It can be argued that the “deregulation fad” impacts the 
attitude of consumers. Unexpected events do not appear to have a significant impact on the 
outcome. The relatively lower explanatory power for the revenue (i.e., about 50%) would imply 
that there are non-price factors that influence the revenue for passenger air service. 
The implementation process of deregulation has worked relatively well. Following its 
initial stage, a dynamic and more complex situation emerges, with a web of completely new 
players that leads to a continuum of bargaining and experimentation. This is the creation of a 
market system according to the objectives of the 1978 deregulation.37 The deregulation of 1978 
has prompted a series of destructive activities 38 and a series of interactions among market forces 
and regulatory agencies. The airline deregulation therefore proved to be the beginning rather than 
the end of the story as a number of problems have arisen. The airline industry today faces an 
assortment of interrelated issues—the financial situation of the industry and of individual 
companies; the tension between competition in and concentration of the industry as part of 
                                                 
37 The implementation of airline deregulation is basically concentrated in the first stage with the disappearance of 
the Civil Aeronautics Board, and it is consistent with the logic of “big bang.” In this respect, the strength of the six 
variables of Daniel Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier. Implementation and Public Policy.  (Lanham, Maryland: 
University Press of America, 1989) and the “classical technocracy” model of T. Robert Smallwood and Frank 
Nakamura. The Politics of Policy Implementation, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1980) fit well with the policy 
makers’ intention to dramatically change the airline business, that is, precipitate a big bang. Following these 
changes, it is mainly the market that deals with the various forces that emerge. 
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economic regulation (for example, antitrust enforcement); safety and security as part of social 
regulation; and the global market. All these interlinked issues compound the challenges for 
policy makers in planning for future actions. The model shows that the implementation of 
deregulation has let two policies work effectively: regulatory and antitrust policies39. 
 The dismantling of comprehensive regulation does not imply total government laissez-
faire. In fact, deregulation allows the government to relinquish some actions (e.g., establishing 
pricing and entry) but expand others (e.g., bankruptcy, antitrust, global market, capacity, and 
social regulation). All these variables that represent the institutional setting and can be observed 
in a time-series analysis and be part of a testable “theory” of the implementation process of 
deregulation and permit the deregulation process to operate effectively.  Despite the economic 
deregulation, government agencies continue to play an important and significant role, but the 
focus has shifted to a different set of questions. For instance, the accidents that occur periodically 
in the airline business are promptly disclosed and start to have an impact the demand of flights.  
“Complaints” is another variable—not included in the model for lack of data—that reflects social 
regulation. The variable “government regulation” captures not only economic regulation but also 
the overall intervention of government. In this respect, social regulation— parallel to economic 
regulation—emerges mainly in relation to safety and security concerns. The U.S. airline 
deregulation is a good example of a successful reform that permits market forces and institutions 
(for example, bankruptcy and mergers) to operate appropriately and assign scarce resources. It is 
important to underline that the market institutions and the government organization mostly 
existed before the deregulation of 1978 and were requested to work differently following the 
reform of 1978.  
Similar attempts at deregulation and privatization (also in sectors other than airline and 
transportation), particularly in emerging markets such as those in Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, occur in a setting that lacks the institutional and market forces for reforms and 
deregulation to have a significant positive impact. A number of research studies have focused on 
                                                                                                                                                             
38 J. William Baumol, “Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive”. Journal of Political Economy 
98, 5, part 1, (1990) pp. 893–921. 
39 W. Kip Viscusi, Joseph E. Harrington and John M. Vernon,  Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, (Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 2005). 
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reforms in emerging countries, and various causal relationships have been explored.40 Several 
analyses have been conducted for reforms in emerging countries, and all present unsatisfactory 
outcomes. In large part—and certainly in Latin America—market-oriented reforms have not 
always functioned well and there has been a strong backlash and a revival of interventionist 
policies. In Latin America, various institutions and organizations particularly those of the public 
sector existed before the reforms, but during the implementation of the reforms did not perform 
as expected. The case of China is different in the sense that market reforms had to create private 
sector institutions, while public sector organizations had to play a total different role than that 
played during the command economy.  
The experience of U.S. airline deregulation may indicate a useful direction of inquiry for 
emerging countries, particularly regarding the role that existing market institutions as well as 
public sector organizations —such as a developed, sophisticated capital market—can play in the 
success of market-oriented reforms. The line of inquiry – differently from those undertaken so 
far – is focusing on implementation and pays great attention to explanatory variables that 
measure and shows the behavior of public sector entities, e.g., department and agencies.  
                                                 
40 See Alberto Chong and Florencio López de Silanes, Editors Privatization in Latin America: Myths and Reality. 
Palo Alto, California, Stanford Economics and Finance, (Washington, D.C, World Bank, 2005). 
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